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ABSTRACT: Like the private managed care plans offered under Medicare Advantage, 
private fee-for-service (PFFS) plans are paid more per beneficiary than those individuals 
would be expected to cost if they were enrolled in traditional fee-for-service Medicare. 
However, PFFS plans are not required to provide the same type of coordinated care 
required of Medicare Advantage plans. Payments to PFFS plans in 2008 average 16.6 percent 
more than costs in traditional Medicare, or $1,248 for each of the 2 million enrollees in 
PFFS plans—a total of nearly $2.5 billion in extra payments. Recently, Congress has made 
significant revisions to policies that will affect how PFFS plans will operate in 2011 and 
thereafter, as well as their prospects for continued growth. This issue brief examines the 
development of PFFS plans, the policies underlying the rapid increase in the plans and their 
enrollment, the payments they receive, and the potential impact of the new legislation.
                    
BACkgRound: PRivATe Fee-FoR-SeRviCe PlAnS 
vS. oTheR MediCARe PlAnS
Rapid growth in enrollment and rising costs have in the past few years made 
Medicare Advantage private fee-for-service (PFFS) plans a prominent part of the 
Medicare program. Created by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA) and 
given a major boost by the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA), these 
plans are endowed with a number of unique characteristics that distinguish them 
from other types of Medicare Advantage plans. Unlike other Medicare 
Advantage plans, PFFS plans are not required to have a contract or other net-
work arrangement with physicians, hospitals, and other providers. Instead, PFFS 
plans are allowed to pay providers with which they have no contracts at 
Medicare fee-for-service rates—a provision referred to as “deeming” authority. 
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Health care providers are required by law to accept 
these rates for PFFS plan patients, unless providers 
object before the services are delivered.1
In a May 2008 letter to Senator Chuck Grassley, 
Secretary of Health and Human Services Michael O. 
Leavitt wrote: “The ability to operate without having 
to establish networks is important to the continued 
availability of PFFS plans. Some argue that the 
so-called ‘deeming’ requirement advantages PFFS. 
[But] without deeming, PFFS plans would have 
difficulty establishing provider networks, especially in 
rural areas. Weakening these plans will hurt 
beneficiaries in rural areas.”2
In addition to the deeming policy, other specific 
statutory requirements have allowed PFFS plans to 
operate differently from other private plans under the 
Medicare Advantage program:
1. They are exempt from the quality reporting 
and disclosure requirements to which other 
plans are subject.
2. They are not subject to bid review or 
negotiation with Medicare.
3. Providers, including hospitals, treating PFFS 
plan enrollees may directly charge those 
patients coinsurance of up to 15 percent more 
than the plan payment amount.
As is the case for all Medicare Advantage plans, 
PFFS plans receive payment rates that are substantially 
greater than fee-for-service costs in traditional Medicare, 
which gives them a competitive advantage over that 
program.3 Moreover, the lack of a requirement to 
contract with the physicians used by their enrollees 
means that PFFS plans essentially are exempt from 
having to establish a network in the areas they serve; 
this has enabled them to choose to locate in areas with 
particularly favorable payment rates—areas in which 
other Medicare Advantage plans cannot operate 
because they cannot establish provider networks there. 
As a result, PFFS plans have a competitive advantage 
over other Medicare private plans, as well.
PFFS plans are thought of as helping bring 
private plan options to Medicare beneficiaries in areas 
where such options would not otherwise be available, 
and providing much broader access to providers than 
do the managed care plans that most of the Medicare 
Advantage program comprises.4 In particular, managed 
care has never taken root in rural areas because rural 
providers—who frequently do not face much 
competition in their areas—have no compelling reason 
to sign contracts with managed care plans; given that 
PFFS plans are not required to have contracts with 
their providers, they can establish operations in those 
areas more easily.
However, PFFS plans fail to offer several of the 
perceived advantages of managed care plans, including 
coordinated care and integrated health care delivery. 
Moreover, because of the high payments that PFFS 
plans receive, combined with the steep increase in 
PFFS enrollment, they generate substantial additional 
costs to Medicare, which increasingly have become a 
cause for concern.5
RAPid gRoWTh in PFFS enRollMenT
In the years immediately following their authorization, 
PFFS plans received little attention. Few plans partici-
pated in Medicare, enrolling only a small number of 
beneficiaries. After the MMA was enacted in 2003, PFFS 
plan enrollment began to grow exponentially—from 
220,000 by December 2005 to nearly 2 million in February 
2008 (Figure 1). The number of health insurance firms 
offering Medicare PFFS plans also grew rapidly—
from just four firms with Medicare Advantage PFFS 
contracts in 2004 to 70 with such contracts in 2008.6
FACToRS enCouRAging The develoPMenT 
And gRoWTh oF PFFS PlAnS
The creation of PFFS plans by the BBA in 1997 was a 
response to specific policy concerns. At that time, it 
was not anticipated that these plans would grow to 
today’s national enrollment level of 2 million mem-
bers. The current situation stems from the combined 
effect of five developments in Medicare private-plan 
policies over the past decade:
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Interest in an increasing role for private plans •	
in Medicare. In the late 1990s, many congres-
sional leaders discussed shifting Medicare bene-
ficiaries to a system of managed care plans, 
generally referred to as the “premium support” 
model, as a way of limiting Medicare cost 
increases. Some believed with certainty that all 
Medicare beneficiaries would soon be enrolled 
in private plans.7
Concerns about Medicare utilization review.•	  
Certain groups responded to the private plan-
based prospect of Medicare’s future with great 
concern. Because HMO managed care plans 
have traditionally managed health care costs 
through utilization review, there was some con-
cern that all Medicare private plans would inev-
itably employ utilization review. It was argued 
that this would lead to the rationing of health 
care and a reduction in end-of-life care, which 
some regarded as “involuntary euthanasia.”8 
Given such fears, it was proposed that Medicare 
should permit private plans other than managed 
care plans to participate in an “un-managed 
care” plan model, which became the basis for 
what is now private fee-for-service.
Payment polices to attract private plans.•	  In 
response to the concerns of senators from rural 
states about the failure of managed care plans to 
develop there, the BBA included for the first 
time a policy that would pay private Medicare 
plans more than 100 percent of average costs in 
traditional fee-for-service Medicare—
specifically in rural counties with low fee-for-
service costs—with a portion of the extra pay-
ments allotted for additional benefits to enroll-
ees.9 In 2001, that policy was extended to urban 
counties with low fee-for-service costs, and in 
2003, the MMA ensured that Medicare pay-
ments to private plans under the Medicare 
Advantage program exceed average costs under 
traditional Medicare in every county in the 
nation—though this differential is greater in 
some areas than others.10,11,12
Attraction of extra payments and low start-up •	
costs to national for-profit health insurance firms. 
The combination of the higher payment rates set 
by the MMA and the relative ease of market 
entry for PFFS plans enacted in the BBA attracted 
several major health insurance firms to exploit 
these opportunities by greatly expanding their 
efforts to establish PFFS plans—especially in 
counties with high levels of extra payments—
and to enroll beneficiaries. In September 2007, 
the CIBC World Markets equity-analysis firm 
reported in its analysis of data from Humana, 
one of the country’s largest health insurers: 
“The most surprising find is that the PFFS/PPO 
MLR [Medical Loss Ratio] in 2006 was 150 
basis points better than Humana, Inc.’s HMO 
book, defying conventional wisdom. This has 
implications in Washington, since it supports the 
view that not all of the additional funding received 
by PFFS plans is used for extra benefits.13
Substantial commissions offered to local insur-•	
ance agents for PFFS plan enrollment. As 
loosely organized entities, PFFS plans often 
have used local insurance agents rather than 
plan employees for marketing efforts and the 
enrollment of new members. These local agents 
have played a major role in the increase in 
PFFS membership simply by responding to 
market incentives. Commissions are much 
Figure 1. Total Enrollment in
Medicare Advantage PFFS Plans,1999–2008
Note: Data are from March of each year.
Source: Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, Medicare Health and Prescription Drug Plan 
Tracker, available at: www.kff.org.
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larger for the enrollment of new Medicare 
Advantage plan members—about $400 to $500 
per enrollee in 2007, in comparison with new 
members in Medicare’s private prescription drug 
plans (PDPs), which are $60 to $80 per enrollee—
because annual Medicare payments to Medicare 
Advantage plans are significantly larger than 
those made to PDPs.14,15 The extreme interest of 
local agents in marketing PFFS plans was docu-
mented in the summer of 2007 when, through 
an agreement with the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services, the seven major national 
PFFS plans suspended enrollment—in part 
because of complaints about misleading market-
ing practices by local plan agents.16
Some of these factors have been at least partially 
addressed by the Congress in the Medicare Improvements 
for Patients and Providers Act of 2008 (MIPPA), as 
discussed below. These provisions, however, will not 
take effect until 2011, and are expected to slow, but 
not reverse, the impact of PFFS plans.
PFFS PlAnS And PAyMenT RATeS 
in The AReAS They SeRve
PFFS plans appear to aim their marketing at counties 
with very high levels of Medicare Advantage payments 
relative to what traditional fee-for-service Medicare 
spends. Overall, payments to the PFFS plans average 
16.6 percent more than average costs in traditional fee-
for-service Medicare—that is, PFFS plans receive on 
average 16.6 percent more than their own enrollees 
would be expected to cost if they had remained in tra-
ditional Medicare; this differential, which has been 
referred to as ‘extra payments,’ is 11.6 percent for all 
other types of Medicare Advantage plans.17
Evidence that PFFS plans are dependent on high 
Medicare extra payments is provided by the pattern of 
bids that all MA plans are required to submit. Since 2006, 
Medicare Advantage plans have been required to submit 
bids to Medicare that represent the payment they would be 
willing to accept for providing to their enrollees the same 
benefits offered by traditional Medicare. The amount 
that each plan receives for each enrollee is a function of 
the difference between the plan’s bid and a benchmark 
rate set for each county.18 The average bids submitted 
by Medicare Advantage health maintenance organiza-
tions (HMOs)—which, unlike PFFS plans, are required 
to have contracts with local providers—was 99 percent 
of corresponding costs in traditional fee-for-service 
Medicare in the areas they serve (Figure 2).19 PFFS 
plans, however, submitted bids that were 108 percent of 
fee-for-service Medicare costs in the areas they serve—
implying that their costs are 8 percent more than Medicare 
would be expected to spend on the same beneficiaries in 
the same areas. In addition, because they operate in areas 
that have benchmark rates that are considerably higher 
than average, PFFS plans receive a sizeable rebate—for 
a total payment that averages 16.6 percent more than 
spending would be in traditional fee-for-service Medicare.
The availability of these extra payments beyond 
the costs of traditional fee-for-service Medicare, together 
with the provisions of Medicare law that enable easy 
market entry for firms wishing to establish PFFS plans, 
have enabled health insurance companies to capture 
substantial revenues with little investment or risk, and 
without the coordinated care that has been the histori-
cal argument for the role of private plans in Medicare.
MediCARe AdvAnTAge PRivATe Fee-FoR-
SeRviCe PlAn exTRA PAyMenTS in 2008
Medicare Advantage extra payments in general, com-
bined with policies specific to PFFS plans, have led to 
Figure 2. Medicare Advantage Plan Bids by Plan Type
Source: Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, Report to the Congress: Medicare 
Payment Policy (Washington, D.C.: MedPAC, Mar. 2008). 
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PFFS plan payments that are greater than average fee-
for-service and other MA plan costs. Total extra payments 
to PFFS plans are projected to total almost $2.5 billion in 
2008. In fact, payments to PFFS plans average 5 percent 
more than payments to other Medicare Advantage plans, 
equivalent to $310 more per enrollee.
Between December 2005 and February 2008, the 
total amount of extra payments going to PFFS plans grew 
eightfold. In 2005, extra payments to PFFS plans repre-
sented just 6 percent of the total extra payments going 
to all MA plans. In 2008, however, the share of extra 
payments going to PFFS plans has grown to an estimated 
29 percent (Figure 3).20 Extra payments to PFFS plans 
in 2008 vary by county payment category, by state, 
and by urban/rural designation (Appendix Table 1).
Patterns in extra payments by state. There is 
distinct variation across states in the amount of extra 
payments going to PFFS plans. In Wisconsin, where 
there are high levels of extra payments per enrollee for 
all Medicare Advantage plans, PFFS plans are paid an 
average of 122 percent of traditional fee-for-service 
Medicare costs, or $1,564 in extra payments per PFFS 
plan enrollee. Enrollment in PFFS plans in Wisconsin 
accounts for 64 percent of total MA plan enrollment in 
the state. The total of annual extra payments that went 
to PFFS plans in Wisconsin in 2008 was approxi-
mately $182 million (Appendix Table 2).
Similar patterns of extra payments and enroll-
ment can be found in Indiana, where 83 percent of all 
Medicare Advantage enrollees are in PFFS plans. These 
plans are paid an average of 118 percent of traditional 
FFS Medicare costs—nearly five percentage points 
higher than the rate paid to other Medicare Advantage 
plans in the state. PFFS plans in Indiana receive $1,343 
in extra payments per PFFS enrollee annually, and 
over $100 million in annual extra payments statewide.
There is significant variation within each state 
between the average extra payments to PFFS plans and 
to all other Medicare Advantage plans in the state. In 
some states—including California, Pennsylvania, and 
New York—the average extra payment to PFFS plans 
is dramatically higher than the average extra payment 
amount to all other Medicare Advantage plans. In New 
York, extra payments to PFFS plans average 26.3 per-
cent, compared with a 13.2 percent average for other 
Medicare Advantage plans in the state.
Patterns in extra payments by urban/rural 
designation. Despite the promotion of PFFS plans as a 
way to bring private plans to rural areas, the majority 
of PFFS plan enrollment and extra payments are in 
fact in urban areas, with 60 percent of PFFS enroll-
ment in urban areas in 2008, and 66 percent of PFFS 
extra payments going to urban PFFS plans (Figure 4). 
If extra payments can be seen as providing extra 
incentives to private plans to enter the Medicare  
Dec–05 Feb–08
Figure 3. Growth in Extra Payments to PFFS Plans, 
December 2005–February 2008
Source: George Washington University analysis of Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services Medicare Managed Care State/County/Contract data file released February 2008; 
Medicare Managed Care Quarterly State County data file for December 2005 and the 
Medicare Advantage 2005 and 2008 Rate Calculation Data spreadsheets. 
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Figure 4. Share of PFFS Enrollment and Extra Payments
in Urban Versus Rural Areas, 2008
Source: George Washington University analysis of Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services Medicare Managed Care State/County/Contract data file released February 2008; 
Medicare Managed Care Quarterly State County data file for December 2005 and the 
Medicare Advantage 2008 Rate Calculation Data spreadsheets. 
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program, that incentive appears to be stronger in urban 
than in rural areas: the average extra payment to PFFS 
plans in urban areas is 18 percent, compared with 14.5 
percent in rural areas.
ChAngeS AFFeCTing PRivATe Fee-FoR-
SeRviCe PlAnS in The MediCARe 
iMPRoveMenTS FoR PATienTS And 
PRovideRS ACT oF 2008
The Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers 
Act of 2008 (MIPPA) contained a number of provisions 
to improve Medicare benefits and provider payments. 
In order to make the legislation budget neutral as a 
whole—in other words, so that it would not increase 
the projected federal deficit—MIPPA included some 
provisions that would reduce total extra payments to 
MA plans. Among those were changes that affect the 
organization and operation of PFFS plans. One new 
policy removes the deeming authority for PFFS plans 
and requires PFFS plans in certain areas to establish 
networks of contracted providers beginning in 2011.21 
Another requires that PFFS plans implement quality 
improvement programs and establishes data collection 
and reporting requirements beginning in 2011 similar 
to those already in place for local PPO plans.
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has 
projected these new policies will noticeably reduce 
PFFS enrollment in 2011 and future years. CBO esti-
mates that the changes to PFFS policies will signifi-
cantly slow the growth in PFFS plan enrollment by 2013, 
but still project that about 40 percent more beneficia-
ries will be enrolled in these plans in 2013 than in 2008.22
ConCluSion
As insurers actively take advantage of Medicare policies 
that explicitly pay all MA plans more than traditional fee-
for-service Medicare and provide exceptions that make 
PFFS plans particularly attractive, these plans will add 
$2.5 billion to Medicare spending this year. Payments to 
PFFS plans in 2008 average $1,248 per year for each of 
the 2 million Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in PFFS 
plans, or 16.6 percent more than their costs would be in 
traditional fee-for-service Medicare.
The relative ease of market entry for PFFS 
plans has meant that organizations wishing to offer 
these plans in counties with high Medicare payment 
rates relative to costs in traditional Medicare have 
been able to selectively establish themselves in such 
areas without having to offer the coordinated care that 
historically has been expected of private plans in 
Medicare. Indeed, the analysis presented here indicates 
that PFFS plans have concentrated their focus on 
counties with especially high levels of extra payments.
It is important to note that PFFS enrollment 
and payments are heavily focused in urban areas, 
despite their perceived role as bringing Medicare pri-
vate plans and their promise of extra benefits to rural 
beneficiaries. Of the total of $2.5 billion in extra pay-
ments to PFFS plans in 2008, only 34 percent goes to 
rural counties. Incentives actually favor the urban 
counties; extra payments to PFFS plans in urban areas 
average 18 percent, or $1,387 per enrollee annually, 
compared with 14.5 percent, or $846, to PFFS plans in 
rural areas.
While the legislation enacted in July 2008 
made significant changes to the requirements facing 
PFFS plans, these changes will not take effect until 
2011. This suggests that current patterns of increasing 
PFFS plan enrollment and extra payments may con-
tinue to be present over the next two years, then slow 
(but not necessarily stop) after that. Although CBO has 
projected that PFFS enrollment growth will decline 
compared with what it would have been under current 
law, these plans will continue to compose a large pro-
portion of Medicare Advantage enrollment. Moreover, 
the current location of PFFS plans and their enrollees 
in counties with very high levels of extra payments by 
Medicare may provide more than adequate compensa-
tion to health insurance firms to cover the additional 
costs incurred by the newly enacted requirement to 
form physician networks. If this is the case, we will 
continue to see an unequal geographic distribution of 
PFFS plan enrollment and percentage of extra pay-
ments, with the majority centered in urban rather than 
rural areas.
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Appendix Table 1. Extra Payments in 2008, by County Payment Type, 
to MA Private Fee-for-Service Plans Compared with Average Fee-for-Service Costs1
Average Payment Beyond FFS Costs2,3,4
County 
Payment Type
Medicare 
Beneficiaries5
PFFS 
Plan 
Enrollees6
PFFS
Plan
Enrollment
Rate
Average 
Extra 
Amount 
per PFFS 
Plan 
Enrollee
Total 
Annual 
Extra 
Payments 
to PFFS 
Plans 
(millions)
Average 
Extra 
Payment 
to PFFS 
Plans 
Beyond 
FFS Costs
Average
Extra
Payment
to All Other
(non-PFFS)
MA Plans
Beyond
FFS Costs
National 42,986,173 1,995,372 4.6% $1,248 $2,490.0 16.6% 11.6%
Rural Floor 7,677,075 582,162 7.6 1,196 696.5 17.1 17.3
Urban Floor 11,346,652 815,692 7.2 1,595 1,301.2 21.4 19.9
Blend 1,404,844 29,401 2.1 1,039 30.6 13.4 15.1
Minimum Update 2,495,260 82,881 3.3 1,145 94.9 13.9 10.5
100% FFS 20047 3,246,396 98,611 3.0 1,247 122.9 14.2 14.3
100% FFS 20057 14,037,766 348,739 2.5 685 238.8 7.9 6.7
100% FFS 20077 2,778,180 37,886 1.4 124 4.7 1.4 1.7
1 Calculations exclude payments to teaching hospitals for the IME expenses both of MA and fee-for-service (FFS) beneficiaries.
2 Calculations at the county level, weighted by MA enrollment. Excludes MA enrollees in cost plans. Calculations include budget-neutral 
risk adjustment of 1.0169.
3 In 2006 and future years, the MMA provides that payments to MA plans change from a system based entirely on county benchmarks 
to one that combines county benchmarks with a bid by each individual MA plan. The new benchmark-based bidding system allocates 
75% of the difference between the county benchmark and the MA plan bid to the plan and 25% to the federal government. Analysts at 
MedPAC who have studied Medicare private-plan payments and costs have found that the average MA plan bid is approximately 17% 
less than the county benchmark and the average MA Private Fee-for-Service (PFFS) plan bid falls approximately 12% less than the 
county benchmark. This would result in a 4.25% reduction in benchmark extra-payment rates to all MA plans and a 3% reduction in 
benchmark extra payment rates to MA PFFS plans. The above calculations account for average MA plan bids 17% below the 2007 MA 
benchmark rates and PFFS plan bids 12% below the 2007 MA benchmark rates. See: Medicare Payment Advisory Commission,  
Report to the Congress: Medicare Payment Policy (Washington, D.C.: MedPAC, Mar. 2008).
4 For these calculations, 2007 FFS rates have been adjusted by 5.71% in accordance with the updated national estimates for 2008 on per 
capita MA growth percentage, released by CMS on April 2, 2007. See: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, “Announcement of 
Calendar Year (CY) 2008 Medicare Advantage (MA) Capitation Rates and Payment Policies” (Washington, D.C.: CMS, Apr. 2, 2007), 
Available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/Downloads/Announcement2008.pdf.
5 Medicare beneficiary totals as of December 2005.
6 Medicare Advantage PFFS enrollment data as of February 2008.
7 CMS decided to rebase the 100% of FFS rate at the county level in 2005 and 2007. Rebasing the FFS rates means that CMS 
retabulated the per capita FFS expenditures for each county so that the FFS rates reflected more recent county growth trends in FFS  
expenditures. The MMA provided that the county-level payment rate for MA plans in 2005 be the higher of the 2005 rebased 100% of FFS  
rate or the 2004 rate increased by 6.6%. See: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, “Note to Medicare Advantage Organizations 
and Other Interested Parties: Advance Notice of Methodological Changes for Calendar Year (CY) 2005 Medicare Advantage Payment 
Rates” (Washington, D.C.: CMS, Mar. 26, 2004). Available at: http://www.cms.hhs.gov/healthplans/rates/2005/45day.pdf. Accessed 
September 15, 2004. For 2007, the county-level payment rate for MA plans was the higher of the 2007 rebased 100% of FFS rate or the 
2006 rate increased by 7.1%. See: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, “Announcement of Calendar Year (CY) 2007 Medicare 
Advantage Capitation Rates and Medicare Advantage and Part D Payment Policies Fact Sheet” (Washington, D.C.: CMS, Apr. 3, 2006). 
Available at: http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/Downloads/factsheet2007.pdf. Accessed May 30, 2006.
Note: Calculations exclude Medicare beneficiaries and MA enrollees in Puerto Rico, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Also, because 
of HIPAA concerns, CMS does not include enrollment data in the State/County/Contract Data Files for plans with 10 or fewer enrollees in a 
county. For 2008, this exclusion pertains to approximately 230,000 enrollees nationwide.
Source: George Washington University analysis of Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Medicare Managed Care 
State/County/Contract Data File, released February 2008; Medicare Managed Care Quarterly State, County Data File for the quarter 
ending December 2005; and the Medicare Advantage 2008 Rate Calculation Data Spreadsheet.
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Appendix Table 2. Extra Payments in 2008, by State, 
to MA Private Fee-for-Service Plans Compared with Average Fee-for-Service Costs1
Average Payment Beyond FFS Costs2,3,4
State
Medicare 
Beneficiaries5
PFFS 
Plan 
Enrollees6
PFFS 
Plan 
Enrollment 
Rate
Average 
Extra 
Amount 
per PFFS 
Plan 
Enrollee
Total 
Annual 
Extra 
Payments 
to PFFS 
Plans 
(millions)
Average 
Extra 
Payment 
to PFFS 
Plans 
Beyond 
FFS Costs
Average
Extra
Payment
to All Other
(non-PFFS)
MA Plans
Beyond
FFS Costs 
National 42,986,173 1,995,372 4.6% $1,248 $2,490.0 16.6% 11.6%
Rural 12,692,302 810,772 6.4 1,044 846.0 14.5 11.0
Urban 30,293,871 1,184,600 3.9 1,387 1,643.0 18.0 11.7
Alabama 781,601 19,035 2.4 875 16.7 11.3 9.9
Alaska 45,701 88 0.2 715 0.1 8.3 —
Arizona 818,639 34,347 4.2 1,015 34.9 13.2 13.9
Arkansas 489,388 35,272 7.2 1,160 40.9 15.9 9.6
California 4,386,037 45,076 1.0 1,444 65.1 18.9 10.5
Colorado 542,294 22,547 4.2 769 17.3 10.2 11.2
Connecticut 540,699 5,971 1.1 634 3.8 7.5 5.1
Delaware 132,269 2,516 1.9 585 1.5 7.0 7.4
Dist. Columbia 77,597 724 0.9 1,466 1.1 16.1 16.1
Florida 3,129,832 48,069 1.5 486 23.4 5.8 3.3
Georgia 1,076,986 76,016 7.1 1,127 85.7 14.7 13.3
Hawaii 189,271 2,423 1.3 2,255 5.5 34.2 34.1
Idaho 198,714 20,679 10.4 1,112 23.0 15.3 19.4
Illinois 1,749,064 49,132 2.8 878 43.1 11.6 8.1
Indiana 934,910 75,183 8.0 1,343 100.9 18.3 13.5
Iowa 502,547 35,501 7.1 1,588 56.4 23.5 20.2
Kansas 412,026 13,548 3.3 1,076 14.6 14.0 11.1
Kentucky 704,727 51,928 7.4 936 48.6 12.4 11.1
Louisiana 642,618 23,570 3.7 1,167 27.5 12.7 12.9
Maine 243,190 7,104 2.9 1,421 10.1 20.0 25.2
Maryland 718,389 4,440 0.6 560 2.5 6.6 3.8
Massachusetts 1,007,212 24,604 2.4 933 23.0 10.3 9.9
Michigan 1,537,840 251,702 16.4 793 199.6 10.0 7.8
Minnesota 721,521 67,793 9.4 952 64.5 13.1 9.3
Mississippi 471,940 27,265 5.8 972 26.5 11.8 8.4
Missouri 942,794 34,587 3.7 1,167 40.4 16.0 12.8
Montana 153,286 18,785 12.3 954 17.9 13.3 15.3
Nebraska 267,836 14,036 5.2 973 13.7 13.2 11.4
Nevada 308,802 5,709 1.8 386 2.2 4.6 2.5
New Hampshire 194,363 6,787 3.5 1,106 7.5 14.1 12.7
New Jersey 1,270,110 3,454 0.3 410 1.4 4.5 3.9
New Mexico 277,591 8,500 3.1 1,757 14.9 26.5 36.3
New York 2,879,429 40,621 1.4 1,801 73.2 26.3 13.2
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Average Payment Beyond FFS Costs2,3,4
State
Medicare 
Beneficiaries5
PFFS 
Plan 
Enrollees6
PFFS 
Plan 
Enrollment 
Rate
Average 
Extra 
Amount 
per PFFS 
Plan 
Enrollee
Total 
Annual 
Extra 
Payments 
to PFFS 
Plans 
(millions)
Average 
Extra 
Payment 
to PFFS 
Plans 
Beyond 
FFS Costs
Average
Extra
Payment
to All Other
(non-PFFS)
MA Plans
Beyond
FFS Costs 
North Carolina 1,318,782 113,409 8.6% $1,448 $164.3 19.8% 21.5%
North Dakota 106,313 5,794 5.4 1,185 6.9 16.9 16.0
Ohio 1,811,669 175,147 9.7 1,045 183.0 13.4 14.0
Oklahoma 559,862 16,809 3.0 720 12.1 8.7 7.9
Oregon 557,661 20,902 3.7 1,643 34.3 24.3 25.4
Pennsylvania 2,189,492 68,051 3.1 1,358 92.4 18.8 9.2
Rhode Island 177,579 1,462 0.8 1,423 2.1 18.4 18.9
South Carolina 673,878 58,059 8.6 1,117 64.8 14.5 12.2
South Dakota 128,623 5,111 4.0 1,203 6.1 17.3 17.7
Tennessee 955,071 50,738 5.3 1,058 53.7 13.7 13.1
Texas 2,641,789 73,082 2.8 1,192 87.1 13.0 16.3
Utah 245,106 24,816 10.1 1,289 32.0 17.5 20.2
Vermont 100,351 2,167 2.2 1,169 2.5 16.6 13.7
Virginia 1,023,393 87,446 8.5 1,625 142.1 22.9 23.1
Washington 851,609 45,071 5.3 1,222 55.1 16.5 21.1
West Virginia 367,440 51,840 14.1 1,071 55.5 14.4 12.3
Wisconsin 854,772 116,380 13.6 1,564 182.0 22.4 20.5
Wyoming 73,560 2,076 2.8 649 1.3 8.7 8.8
1 Calculations exclude payments to teaching hospitals for the IME expenses both of MA and fee-for-service (FFS) beneficiaries.
2 Calculations at the county level, weighted by MA enrollment. Excludes MA enrollees in cost plans. Calculations include budget neutral 
risk adjustment of 1.0169.
3 In 2006 and future years, the MMA provides that payments to MA plans change from a system based entirely on county benchmarks 
to one that combines county benchmarks with a bid by each individual MA plan. The new benchmark-based bidding system allocates 
75% of the difference between the county benchmark and the MA plan bid to the plan and 25% to the federal government. Analysts at 
MedPAC who have studied Medicare private-plan payments and costs have found that the average MA plan bid is approximately 17% 
less than the county benchmark and the average MA Private Fee-for-Service (PFFS) plan bid falls approximately 12% less than the 
county benchmark. This would result in a 4.25% reduction in benchmark extra payment rates to all MA plans and a 3% reduction in 
benchmark extra payment rates to MA PFFS plans. The above calculations account for average MA plan bids 17% below the 2007 MA 
benchmark rates and PFFS plan bids 12% below the 2007 MA benchmark rates. See: Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, Report 
to the Congress: Medicare Payment Policy (Washington, D.C.: MedPAC, Mar. 2008).
4 For these calculations, 2007 FFS rates have been adjusted by 5.71% in accordance with the updated national estimates for 2008 on 
per capita MA growth percentage released by CMS on April 2, 2007. See: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (April 2, 2007). 
“Announcement of Calendar Year (CY) 2008 Medicare Advantage (MA) Capitation Rates and Payment Policies.” Washington, D.C.: 
CMS. Available at: http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/Downloads/Announcement2008.pdf.
5 Medicare beneficiary totals as of December 2005.
6 Medicare Advantage PFFS enrollment data as of February 2008.
Note: Because of HIPAA concerns, CMS does not include enrollment data in the State/County/Contract Data Files for plans with 10 or 
fewer enrollees in a county. For 2008, this exclusion amounts to approximately 230,000 enrollees nationwide.
Source: George Washington University analysis of Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Medicare Managed Care 
State/County/Contract Data File released February 2008; Medicare Managed Care Quarterly State, County Data File for the quarter 
ending December 2005; and the Medicare Advantage 2008 Rate Calculation Data Spreadsheet.
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